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GETTING UNSTRUCK ON STATUS:

The Politics of Decolonialization
Pedro A. Caban
In December 1988, he (Governor Rafael HenWldez Col6n) skipped the year-end fiestas
that fill Puerto Rican plazas to stroll alone on the Scottish moors and contemplate the

narrowness of his recent re-election.
There he reached a mOIDCitOOS decision: to call for a plebiscite (oow set for 1991)
to decide whether Puerto Rico sOOuld declare iOOependence, become the 51st. state, or
retain albeit in a more precisely defined and updated fonn -its singular status as a

Commonwealth.
Alan Weisman. "An Island in Limbo,"

New York Twes Magazine Section, February 18, 1990
The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has always been an incomplete and unsatisfactory political creation
which even its creator, the Partido Popular Democrdtico (PPD) has sought to amend almost from the moment of
its creation. Ever sirx:e 1950, when Congress authorized the insular administration in Puerto Rico to draft a
constitution and establish a republican fonn of local government. the Commonwealth relation has been condemned by independence a00 stateOOod forces for obscuring and legitimizing Puerto Rico's actual colonial
status. However, until oow, Congress has igoored almost four decades of continuous efforts by Puerto Ricans
from all political sectors to rework the colonial formula.

Goveroor HenWxSez Col6n may have prevailed upon his supponers in Congress to initiate refereOOum
related legislation. Yet, Congress' unanticipated willingness to accede to this request suggests that, finally. the
political and economic conditions are conducive for a change in the colonial relationship.
In coottast to the populady held view quoted above, this paper examines the proposed refere:OOum ~ a
historical process and as the outcome of an onaoing aisis of colonial management. The emergence of a more
stable regional geo-political cnviromlent and new forms of production by multinational firms have resulted in the
erosion of the prevailing Commonwealth (or the Estado Ubre Asociado in Spanish) formula~ a viable doctrine
of imperial rule. The Commoowealth is an archaic form of colonial administration and legitimation that is no
looger OOilSistenl wilh the functiooing ofPueno Rico's contemporary political economy.
The first section provides a brief overview of the various plebiscite initiatives, and examines these in the
context of increased political party competition since the late 1960s. It discusses the plebiscites in light of the

electoral strategies of the stateOOod and Commonwealth parties.
Section two discusses Puerto Rico's transformation from a light manufacturing center producing for U.S.
markets imo an export plad'onn for rechoologically advanced multinational corporatioos. And it examines how
this transformation has affected the colonial state's management of the political economy. The next section
conlinucs the ecommic analysis but focuses on the internationalization of Puerto Rico's economy and its
changing role in the Caribbean region. It discusses the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and its relationship to an
emerging restructuration of the regional economy.
The final section briefly examines the interplay of these diverse forces and developments, and discusses
how they have shaped the staiUS deliberations. The essay concludes by suggesting thal s-112 represera the initial
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stage in a decolonialization process leading to the eventual definition of Pueno Rico's political starus, probably
by the mid-1990s.

TilE POLmCS OF TIIE PLEBISCITES
The history and development of the Partido Popular Democmtico (PPD) have been inextricably tied to the
political formula which now defines Pueno Rico-U.S. relations. The party and its fourxier, fonner Governor
Munoz Mann, were the intellectual architects and promote~ of the Commonwealth. or Estado Ubre Asociado
(ELA). However, during the 1~ thirty-seven years the PPD has relentlessly sought to acquire more autonomous
powers for ELA. It has sought to demarcate the role of the federal government in the cooouct of domestic affam,
and to define a role for Puerto Rico in international commerce, trade and investment. Congress and the executive
bnncb. tmugb. have been reluctant to tinker with the colonial arrangement.

On March 23, 19S9,1ess thm seven years after the proclamation ofELA, Pueno Rico's resident Commissioner inbodua:d legislation in Congress to alter am clarify Public Law 6001 . But the pemstent Congressional
owosition to the implicit claim of sovereignty contained in the bill forced the PPD to substitute a subslantially
revised bill in September 1959. The new measure was subjected to inlense Congressional scrutiny, detailed
studies by executive branch agencies and wide-ranging debate in public hearings. The public hearings revealed
the absence of oonsensus among Pueno Rico's politicalleadeMip on what type of changes should be effected in
Puerto Rico's relationship with the U.S., which its government also opposed any changes in legislation that
restricted the Constitutionally defined prerogatives of the federal government to regulate Pueno Rican affai~.
After two yem of legislative activity Congress failed to act on the measure, and it died quietly in eady 1961.
In the now famous 1962 radio message to the nation, Governor Munoz Mann expressed his intention of
promoting legislation that would provide for a "more perfect Commonwealth." On December 3, 1962 the PPD
controlled legislature enacted a joint-resolution calling upon Congress to initiate a process for a prompt settlement of the swus issue. Through its allies in Congress, three PPD fonnulated bills were introduced in the House

am Senate. 1bese m~ called for creation of a joint U.S. - Pueno Rican Starus Commission that would
examine all areas of the Commonwealth relation, draft recommendations for perfecting a penn anent union, and
establish a procedure for implementing Pueno Rico's final political starus. The proposed bill also required that
Congress enact the Commission's recommeroations concerning a plebiscite.

The PPD's oppooelltS argued the bill was an unabashed partisan attempt by the PPD to legitimize ELA am to
solidify its elc:ctonl base. Again. Congress rejected tlxlse items in the bill that constrained its legislative powe~
over Pueno Rico. It confined the Commission's task to an examination of all the factors concerning Pueno RicoU.S. rebDons, nl required it to draft a detailed report. According to the 0\ainnan of the House Subcommittee
on Territorial and Insular Affam. ''this bill promises oothing more than a high level study." (Ad Hoc Advisory
Group, 108).
The U.S.-Pueno Rican Commission issued its report in 1966 and recommended that a plebiscite be held to
"establish the will of the citizens of Pueno Rico" in which all three status options would be preseJUd. It also
called for the establishment of joint U.S. Pueno Rican ad-hoc Committees to recommend further improvements
in the Commonwealth ~ or the transition measures to the other stanls options if approved in a
plebiscite. Pursuam to this recommeOOation, the PPD controlled legislature enacted the Political Status Plebiscite
Lawof1966.

The plebiscite was held on July 23, 1967, despite a boycott by the Pueno Rican IOOeperxience Party and the
Partido f'.stadista Republicano. A dissident faction of the PER. led by industrialist. Luis Ferre broke from the old
starehood party, and participated in the plebiscite as the United StateOOode~. Voter turnout was uncharacteristically low, (65.8 percent of the registered voter, about a 30 percent lower turnout than for the general elections).

1
"Pubic law 600 prm.ily recognized tMt right ofself.goYerrment by 1he people of PU811D Rico .nd estllbilhed tMt proc::e$1 by which
tMtir ...,...,.._, hely .ncl apecitally elected tar !hal purpose, chhed a consliUon which fie people of PU8f1D Rico adopt8d" Ad
Hoc~ Group, 5.
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Although.the Commonwealth o~ was approved by 60.5 percent of the voters, the PPD leadership had
anticipated a larger percentage of the vote.
Yet. despite the flurry of plebiscite related activity, neither the PPD administration of S4nchez Vilella (19651968) nor the Partido Nuevo Progresista (PNP) administration of LWs Ferre ( 1969-1972) established the ad-OOc:
committees the Commission had recommended. In fact. court action was brought against Governor Ferre to force
him to comply with the Commission's recommendations. However, rather than authorizing a committee to study
how ELA could be perfected, Ferre established a committee to study the issue of the presidential vote for Puerto
Rico.
In 1973, the PPD n:nuned to power, and attempted to resurrect its cherished dreams for "perfecting the
Commonwealth." On •mber 20, 1973 an Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Puerto Rico was jointly appointed by
the President and the Governor of Puerto Rico. Tile Advisory Group was directed to develop the maximum of
self-government and self-detennination within the frameworlt of Commonwealth , and" recommend on the
extent to which the statutory laws and administrative regulation of the United StaleS apply." (Ad-Hoc Advisory
Group, v).
The Ad Hoc Advisory Group's report was released in October 1975 as the CompactofPermanent Union. It
endorsed a thorough resuuauring of the colonial relationship. It called for granting Puerto Rico the right to
participate in inlemational organizations. jurisdiction over cenain territories held by the United States. control
over tariff and immigration policy, authority to enrer into commercial treaties, exemptions from Federal Fair
Labor Swdards Act, authority to regulate environmental quality standards, and other recommendations for
increased autonomy. The Group also called on the President to endorse the Compact and to refer it to bod1 Houses
for Congressional action.

However, Presidem Gerald Foro did oot act on the recommendation, instead he proposed a stalehood bill
that eventually died in Committee. In reaction to this, PPD President Commissioner Jaime Benitez drafted
legislation patterned on the Ad Hoc Committee's general recommendations and which called for a plebiscite on
status. (Alegrla Ortega, 179). Eight months later, in August 1976, the House SubCommittee on Insular Affairs
approved a revised version of the bill. However, after the PNP victories in 1976 and 1980, no further action was
taken on the plebiscite bill and it died in Committee.
After his defeat. ex-Governor HerrWldez Col6n, recommited himself to the time honored tradition of
perfecting the Commonwealth. His Nueva Tesis, released in 1978 argued that to confront the demands of the
1980's Puerto Rico needs much greater political autooomy over its "propia vida." He called for a number of
changes in Public Law 600, in particular increased insular control over the political economy. La Nueva Tesis
was patterned on the recoounendations of the Compact of Pennanent Union. The PPD was out of government
from 1976 through 1984 md was unable to promote its autonomous agenda. And while it controlled the
governorship in 1984 through 1987, the PPD kept its campaign promise of not making status an issue during its
administration.
However, in 1988 the status issue returned with a vigor and urgency that has not been seen in Puerto Rico
since the early 19S(5. 1be Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources announced its intention of
drafting a status referemum legislation and called upon the political leadership of the statehood, independence
and Commonwealth parties to subnit proposals.
The PPD's proposal for perfecting the Commonwealth reiterated many of the provisions contained in La
Nueva Tesis. Among the most significant provisions were limitations on the applicability of federal laws to
Puerto Rico, expanding Pueno Rico's capacity to enrer into international agreements, and to pursue an independem foreign policy, independent tariff authority, control over immigration and jurisdiction over intell.eaual
property.

This latest request for increased autonomy met the same fate as all the earlier attempts, the Senate
Cooun.ittee rejected sevcneen of the twenty autonomy enhancing recommendations the PPD made. Tile PPD
provisions were caregorically dismissed because they were either inconsislml with the U.S. Constitution or
impjed an appropriation of the powers and prerogatives reserved for the executive br.mch. Stale Department
represelU!ive Mary V. Mochary argued the enhanced Common- wealth proposal would create an unprecedented
political stalUS and ..... would grant to Pueno Rico significant attributes of sovereignty which would be incompat8

ible with remaining part of the United States." The Depanmcnt, ~declared, objected to delegating Puerto Rico
authority vested in the Exealtive Branch by the Constitution and the PPD 's proposal for Puerto Rico to enter into
inlemational agreemeors was "most objectionable." Sbe temfied as "long as Puerto Rico enjoys a status less than
that of independence." it could oot gain greater !Redan to participate in international organizations than it is
currently pennitted. The Bush Administtation reaffirmed the Senate Committee's opposition to "enhanced
Commonwealth." (Hearings).
This brief overview reveals cenain consistencies in the history of status related activities. The PPD never
envisioned the Commonwealth as permanent arrangement. The Commonwealth concept bridged the gap between the historically embedded annexationist and iOOependcnce movements. While the party had a solid
political base, it also attracted those elements of the body politic that aspired to preserve Puerto Rico's cultural
identity, but sought the security of close association with the U.S. On the other ham, iOOependence forces, which
during the 1~ were prominenl among the PPD's leadership m1 intellectual cadres, were drawn to the PPD's
political agenda because it held out the hope of eventual emancipation. However, by the mid-1960s the PPD
experienced serious internal challenges from the genuine autonomist secto~ and was challenged by a rejuvenated
and reconstructed stateOOod movement.

The PPD's electoral success and ability to mobilize durable political support from both sectors was based on
the social benefits and economic growth associated with the Estado Ubre Asociado. PPD strategists were aware
that ELA severely restricted the policy making powers of the government to regulate economic performance.
They reasoned that the PPD's political longevity was based in part on otWning the requisite autonomy from the

federal government to regulate the changing domestic political ecooomy. But its peculiar conception of "autonomy" was to be achieved within the framework of common citizenship, common defense, common manet
and common currency. Thus, for the PPD politics of status has envisioned continued dependence on the U.S.,
enhanced control over ecooomic activity and the electoral prospects of the PPD as intimately related.
The overview also indicates that Congress has consistently refused to effect changes in the Commonwealth
relation that compromised its authority to legislate over Puerto Rico and, in particular, it has rejected any
language which implied bilaterality between Puerto Rico and Congress. Included in this is Congressional
opposition to Puerto Rican claims of sovereignty. Congress also insisted on its prerogative to interpret the results
of any plebiscite, and has viewed past plebiscites as indications of the electorate's preference that are not legally
binding on Congress. Consistently administration officials have cautioned against ameOOing the Federal Relations Act because such changes would invariably result in a derogation of the executive branch's constitutionally
delegated powers. Finally, the U.S. has rejected a role for the United Nations in any process involving a
modification of Puerto Rico's political status. Oaiming not only that the resolution of Puerto Rico's status is a
purely domestic matter, but that the "plebiscites" of 1952 and 1967 conformed to international standards on selfdetermination. Congressional and Administration reaaion to the PPD proposals make it palpably clear that these
concerns are still prevalent.
Because ELA and the PPD are so intimately related, plebiscites, however, assume a different role in the
context of increased political party competition. Invariably the plebiscite becomes a political event used by the
PPD in an effort to erode the statehood party's electoral prospects in forthcoming elections. Alternatively, the
sta1ehood m1 indepc:OOence forces take the opportunity to hammer home the point that Puerto Rico is a colony
whose people are victimized by second-class citizenship, m:l that the prevailing arrangement is unworkable.
Invariably the plebiscites debates become highly partisan and heavily politicized episodes that focus on which
status formula (which political party) will obtain the greatest material benefits to the society.
In another paper, I argue that since the mid-19605 the PPD has sought to reassen its political hegemony by
negotiating increased autooomous powers for the Commonwealth. (CatWl. 1990). It recognized, in the early
1960s that the status issue had acquired a new urgency, since the PPD felt its continued political hegemony was
contingent, in part on wresting more autonomy and support from the federal government. However, the 1967
plebiscite backfired, it intensified divisions within the PPD, fortified a younger m1 more sophisticated leadership
in the.statehood movc:mell., and actually contrioob:d to the PPD's electoral defeat in 1968. Rather than demonstrating irrefutable and deep-seated support for the Commonwealth, the plebiscite raised the specter of a
dissatisfied electorate that wanted a new political leadership.

9

'The emergence and consolidation of the Partido Nuevo Progresista as a viable opposition force has resulted
in events unanticipated by the U.S. The federal government has repeatedly declared that it will respect the wishes
of the Puerto Rican for any option they favor. However, until recently the U.S. has not specified the conditions
W¥ier which it would do so. Congress, has igrxnd calls by Puerto Ricans that it is the responsibility of the U.S.
to initiate a legitimate decolonialization process. It has been able to deflect these demands because, until1976, the
statehood movement did not seem to pose a genuine threat to the hegemony of the PPD, ootwithstanding the
PNP's gubemaiOrial victory in 1968. Yet, subsequent PNP victories in 1976 and 1980, plus its extremely strong
showing in the following two elections, has impressed Congress with the depth and strength of armexationist
sentiment.
As long as the PPD was the dominanl political party Congress did not have to seriously contemplate
statehood for Puerto Rico. Its long-standing commitment to approve a status change consistent with Puerto
Rico's wishes was a statement of principle that few expected Congress would have to act on. But the unanticipated vibrancy and durability of the PNP has shaken Congress from its quiescence, and forced it to deal with the
consequences of granting statehood. These include the impact that increased federal transfers will have on the
national deficit. the ronsequcnces of a sizeable Latioo block in Congress, and uocertainty as to whether the
nationalist and pro-independence forces would peacefully relinquish their century~ struggle for sovereignty.

ll is impon.am to emJNsizc that elections in Puerto Rico sOOuld not be seen as popular mm:lates for a
panicular swus option. Since Congress has refused, until recently, to act seriously on the status options. Puerto
Ricans have correctly assumed that ELA would be not be affected, irrespective of which pany came to power.
Decisions by the elcctorare reflect its concerns regarding which party can promoce employment and sustain. or
increase, the infusions of public capital from the United States. Nonetheless, given the perennial crisis of the
insular eoonomy, it is untenable for Congress to dismiss the significance of the statehood movement.

TilE END OF BOOTSTRAP
Efforts by Puerto Ricans to redefine the tenns of colonialism gained momentum during the mid-1960s. But,
the swus issue would have laid donnant had not the PNP won the elections of 1968 and the economy accelerated
its arduous and painful transfonnation. The presumed linkage between status change and social well being has
been • the core of the confliaual party system. In fact, the more vigorous efforts by the PPD and the PNP since
the mid-19605 to alter the relations of colonialism coincide with the exhaustion of the labor intensive iMustrializatiOn stJategy and the restructuring of Puerto Rico's ecoriomy.
1be process of economic restructuring was gradual. But by the late 1960s it was apparent that immediate
ac:Doo by the Puerto Rican government was necessary to offset the social and economic impact of Operation
Bootstrap's unanticipated demise. In 1968 the newly elected statehood government of Luis Ferre was confronted
almost from the stan with a profound crisis of economic management and deterioration in social coOOitions. The

insular governmert ameliorared the intensity of this dislocation by quickly expanding public sector employment,
by undertaking an accelerated program of public finarad construction and by successfully lobbying the federal
goveiiiiDeU for more fuOOs, (Vtllamil).

But by the end of the Ferre administration it was clear that Puerto Rico's traditional model of growth had run
its course. The PPD returned to power in 1m after Puerto Rico had irretrievable lost its comparative advanrage
over labor costs. But even more unfortunare for PPD was that its return coincided with the OPEC induced
recession of the early 1970§. Puerto Rico's ccooomy was badly shaken and by the mid -1~ a series of
disJocalioos thleatencd social stability; corporate profitability was W¥ier siege, investor confidence appeared to
be evaporating, the Puerto Rican govemnent's budget deficits were unsustainable. its public debt had expanded
1D unpn:cedentcd levels, its ability to generate capital from the bond markets was in jeopardy because of a rapidly
deterioraling credit rating, unemployment levels were in the mid 20 percent, and labor unrest threatened vital
public services and production (Cabml. 1989).

Govc:roor HeriWldez ColOO reacted to this unprecedented threat to ELA by calling for enhanced autooomy
for the Commonwealth, and by funning a high-levd Committee to Study's Puerto Rico's Finances (the Tobin
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Committee).The govenunent wanted to rapidly reestablish Pueno Rico's once-vaunted internationally favorable
investmenl climate. The Tobin Committee's report, in conjunction with the conclusions in the Compact of
Permanem Union, left little doubt t.tw the colony was in trouble. Moreover, both studies painfully documented
the limited powers 1hat the Pueno Rican govenunent had to effectively manage the political economy. As a
model for effective political administration and economic growth ELA was in jeopardy of dissolving.
The Tobin Committee's sobering conclusion was t.tw Pueno Rico's govenuneru could resurrect a favorable
investmctt climate only by providing more generous corporate subsidies and tax incentives~ by exercising
budgetary restraint. and by increasing the revenue base and suppressing wage costs. In short, a modified austerity
pacbge patterned along the lines of an International Monetary Fund stabilization program was necessary,
according to the Committee, to restore profitability and investment.

As noted above, the Ford Administration rejected the PPD's request for increased policy making powers.
However, near the end of the PPD's administration in 1976, Congress did amend existing federal taxation in order
to encourage U.S. corporations to reinvest in Pueno Rico. The new tax regulation, lax>wn as Section936 of the
Intemal Revenue Code appear to have been motivated by two concerns. The U.S. T~ry Department wanted
to prevem axporatioos in Puerto Rioo from converting interest on Eurodollar deposits into possessiom income,
and diJs avoiding federal taxes. Under previous legislation (Section 931), U.S. subsidiaries could repattiare
earnings tax free only upoo liquidation of their operations. To discourage this practice, and in fact to stimulate
inaeased invesbncnts in the local ecaany, Section 936 allowed tax free repatriation and provided a credit for
non-business income (United Stares Depanment of the Treasury).
Section 936 was also corresponded to the Puerto Rican government's strategy of attracting firms with a
higher capital to labor ratio. High labor costs had essentially knocked Puerto Rico out of the labor intensive expon
oriented nwufacturing market While increasing labor costs in Pueno Rico were partially a function of market
conditions. they were also a function of the gradual phasing in of the federal minimum wage. Section 936
attracted lbe IDOI'e capital iltensive finns that found Pueno Rico's costs for skilled labor intemationally competitive.
Ironically, since the gap between remittances and invesunents increased after 1976 Section 936 appears to
have bad the effect of accelerating the repatriation of profits and dividends to the U.S. (Edwin Melmdez, 1990,
Dietz 1987). The new tax provisions advanced the transition to an economy in which multinational corporations
appropria1ed the dominant role. When combined with the generous industrial incentives and subsidies, tax
exemptions and low wages, Section 936 oonvened Puerto Rico into an incredibly profitable investment site for
multinational fums. partiadady ill the electronics, pharmaceuticals and precision instruments sectors. The new
tax law also fortified and expanded the "maquiladora" productive process that was the linchpin of Puerto Rico's
mmufaauring strategy during the 195<B and 19605 (Pantojas, 1985). Multinational finns were increasingly
using Puerto Rico as a manufacturing export enclave that processed, assembled, tested and packaged intermediate and semi-marufactured producls. And by the mid-1980s Section 936 was directly responsible for Puerto
Rico's emergence as an importam cenler for finance and banking capital.
These finDs were highly mobile, with production sites throughout the world and relied on Puerto Rico oot
as esseftia1 produaioo site for their global operations. but as a convenient locus through which they oould
ctamd their excess capital. As James Dietz has pointed out, "economic growth can be attributed in large
measure to atrmsferofvalue within an intemational circuit of capital and within the structure of the inlemaDonal
firm thin to a process of true productive growth of the island's econcmy."( Dietz, 1987474) In short, Sec:tion936
set the institutiooal anext for the restructuring of Puerto Rico's ecooomy into a high-tech and financial cemer
for the Caribbean. The implications of this dwlge were to be acutely felt by the mid 1980s.
This brief OYeJView of chanp in Puerto Rioo 's productive suuaure from the late-19605 through the mid·
1980s sugescs an erosion of the insular government's capacity to direa economic perfonnmce. Clearly, Section
936 was an imponmt fiscal device that accelerated the ttansition to a higher stage of capitalist production. But,
equally as importam was the reliance on more sophisticaled production processes and technologies employed by
the multinational corporatioos. Aspects of modem capitalist production that are increasingly beytni the reach of
nation stares. let alone colonies, to regulate.

But the essential point is that the federal govenunent enacted special legislation to make Pueno Rico a more

favonbJc site for capital accumulation wittx>ut either altering the colonial status or granting entwx:ed policymaking powers to the insular government When the new model of accumulation failed to generate the expected
11

gains in employment or public revenues, the U.S. was compelled to increase its funding to the poverty stricken
Islar¥1.
The continued viability ofELA was the consequence of the special tax provisions and related restructuring

under the auspices of the multinational corporation. By the late 1970s a policy debate regarding the utility of the
prevailing colonial relationship for capital accumulation and for preserving U.S. security interests in the region
was underway in the executive brandt

COLONIALISM UNDER CHALLENGE
By the late 197~ the "isle of enchanonent" was proving to be financially draining, difficult to administer
and seemed to conbibute little to advancing the interest of the empire. Moreover, the maner of Puerto Rico's
status persisted in being an itksome international issue (Pastor).
The Carter Administralion undertook a high level evaluation of the status situation, and was cautiously
moving toward proposing a plebiscite. with independence as a viable option. (San Juan Star). But after his defeat.
any ootions about tinkering with the colonial formula were abandoned by the Reagan administration. The United
States was oot about to alter the colooial paradigm in what was at the time a volatile and politically WlStable

Caribbean. Defeating the insurgents in El Salvador, destabilizing an evolving socialist system in Nicaragua.
throttling Cuban involvement in Central America. solidifying Seaga's regime in Jamaica. and suffocating the
anti-imperialist New Jewel Movement in Grenada were critical aims of the Reagan Caribbean policy. Within
Puerto Rico, pro-independence and nationalist forces came under renewed surveillance and attack. Political
stability in Puerto Rico was aucial in this turbulent and changing region, and a plebiscite was out of the question.
Despite the seeming lack of federal government interest during the 80's the academic and public policy
communities generated an Wlcharacteristically volwninous body of literature on Puerto Rico's relationship to the
United States. The various analysis were virtually uniform in identifying the prevailing political and economic
ties as problematic at best and unworkable at worse. 'They consistently raised doubts about the durability and
efficacy of the Commonwealth status and the wisdom of preserving the Island's subon:iinate linkage to the United
States. Implicitly these worts reinforced the notion that the political and economic costs of sustaining the Island's
populalioo and eaxxxnic system are difficult to justify. While they did not assess the continued utility of
colonialism for U.S. business, they emphasized the current phase of capitalist development under colonialism
was m longer as beneficial to either Puerto Rico or the United States as it was once.

These SIUdies oot only sustained the Puerto Rican debate during the dry years of the Reagan administration,
rut provide evidence that the issue was imponant enough for substantial research ftmds to be channeled into think
tanks and policy oriemed sectors of academe. Yet, it appears that their direct impact on the Reagan administration
was minimal More intluenlial oo the Administration's thinking about the Caribbean was the New Right. Its calls
for a curious amalgam of orthodox monetarism, neo-Keynesian militarism and free market principles. combined
with its sword-rattling appeals for resurrecting the Cold War ideology and reasserting U.S. geo-political hegemony in Wesacm ~. formed the cooceptual framework for an aggressive interventionist posture by the
reawakened imperial state.
While the Reagan administration may have igmred Puerto Rico, the same CanJlO{ be said for the Caribbean.
On AugustS, 1983, then President Reagan signed the Canbbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, more popularly
known as the Caribbean Basin Initiative, or the CBI. As originally proposed the CBI would have extemed oneway fn:e tnde ID designated Caribbean nations. The regional development plan was originally intended to
promoce labor intemive manufacturing with low capital requirements and may have drawn its inspiration from
Pucno Rico's original Operatioo Bootstrap (Paruojas, 198S). While CBI did not realize its objectives of significnly inaeasing the value and volwne of trade between the U.S. and the Caribbean, it did stimulate the growth
of textile and electrical equipment exports from beneficiuy countries to the United States <New Yort. Times,

313/90).
The CBI was, in a very real way, a modem cold war variant of the Alliance for Progress. It was an effon to
address the wxlertying causes of political instability by promoting a model of ecooornic growth based on
12

dependent capitalist development in which U.S. multinational corporations would acquire control of the dynamic
sectors. And as was the case with the Alliarx::e for Progress, the CBI had a decidedly militarist oomponenl In the
economic shadows of CBI the Reagan administration promoted the coordination, modernization and regional
inlegration of the independent security and militaly apparatuses of the Caribbean nations. An eoonornically
dependent and militarily subservient Caribbean would be the best bulwark against the "exponation of revolution"
from CUba and Nicaragua. In this broader scheme Puerto Rico's could play an auxiliary, yet essential role.
(Garda Muniz, Rodrfguez Beruff).
The statehood government of Romero Barcelo vociferously resisted the CBI initiative because it essentially
eradicated the island's preferential access to U.S. mmets and capital. It was nothing short of ironic that the
aggressive advocate of statehood was pleading for retaining key elements of the Foraker Act, that formative
document that codified Puerto Rico's seemingly eternal colonial status. Partially in reaction to Romero's threat to
lobby against the CBI legislation, the Reagan administration made a major concession. It designated Puerto Rico
a beneficiary of CBI by devising a special conten1 requirement provision. This provision allowed Puerto Rican
based industries to import componenlS and semi-manufactures for further processing and assembly in Puerto
Rico. R>r its part, Puerto Rico would make availalie locally deposited profits of the 936 corporations for
iMustria1 developmed projeas in designated Caribbean nations. CBI had the potential for advancing the
instiiUtional and ecooomic integration of the Caribbean, with Puerto Rico conceivably taking on a leadership
(almost sub-imperialist role) in the region.

However, the most notable accomplishment of the CBI is that it accelerated a movement toward coordinated
and integrated production processes which linked Puerto Rico to other Caribbean nations. Maquiladora production arrangement which were the hallmaoo of Puerto Rico's Operation Bootstrap (see Pantojas, 1985) received
a boost from the CBI. But the focus now was on Puerto Rico's role as an intermediary promotional agent for U.S.
multinational corporations in the Caribbean (Dietz 1990). Complementary plant production schemes linked the
Caribbean economies to the U.S. mmets through the value-added haven of Puerto Rico. The most sophisticated
assembly, testing and packaging production phases were situated in Puerto Rico while other production sites in
the Caribbean supplied the intermediate inputs manufactured by cheap labor.
In the coruext of a more regionally based production network, in pan stimulated by the CBI. the significance
of Fl..A as· an institutional component for regionally integrated multinational corporate production declines.
Puerto Rico does have a relatively wcll developed physical infrastrucbJre, banking and fi.naoce capabilities and
skilled managerial and labor force. Because of these attributes Puerto Rico can serve, according to business and
government representalives from the Caribbean, as an economic hub that could finance, ~ge and promote
regionally based manufacturing (San Juan Star Nov 5, 1989). However, these resource attributes are not
derivative oor contingent upon the preservation of the country's colonial status.

CONCLUSIONS
During me 1950§ and 196(B Puerto Rico's colonial relationship was critical in establishing favorable
oonditims for foreign invest~ncn. Puerto Rico's unique characteristics of stable institutional order, proximity to
U.S. markets. COOliDOO currency and tariff, plus its cheap labor and combination of industrial incentives and
exemptions provided fertile ground for the growth of labor intensive industrialization. Moreover, during the first
decade of the post-war era it had fimctioned relatively well as a mechanism for imperial administration, social
legitimation and capital accumulation . But by the mid-19605 ocher small ecooomies in Asia we~ aggressively
expmding inlo Puerto Rico's markets in the U.S. The gradual phasing in of federal minimum wage standards and
tariff reductions, initialed during the Kennedy round, placed additional burdens on Puerto Rico's competitiveness. Puerto Rico's ecooomy was becoming internationalized, open not only to the U.S. but increasingly to
economic forces operating at the global level.
Thus, by the 1970s the very coroitions that were so significant for Operation Bootstrap, were increasingly

anachronistic and secondary to the accumulation strategies of the multinational corporate sector. This tendency

bas accelerated since the mid-1 ~ A mo~ mobile, integrared and expansive capital has defied the insular
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government's traditional interventionist strategy. The post-mid 1970s growth model has been accompanied by
high levels of unemployment. dangerously low labor participation raleS, extensive envirorunental damage and
increased reliance on federal fwxls. Ouunigration has also increased during the last five years. Technological
advances in the productive forces (communications, infonnation and data processing, international banking,
containerized shipping and organizational restructuring of the finn) continue to diminish the relevance of the
Commonwealth fonnula as a key institutional prop for capitalist expansiort
Indeed, Pueno Rico's contribution to regionally linked production and trade currently does not derive from
its unique attributes as a colonial possession. Ralher its more prominent role in promoting complementary
production facilities is a direct outgrowth of Section 936, Caribbean Basin Ecooomic Recovery Act and the
evolution of more sopusticated production processes by multinational capital.
However, this "new colonialism" is fraught with a novel set of contradictions. The old colonialism,
represerued by the FLA fonnula, corresponded to a particular historical period and stage of capitalist developmentA stage in which U.S. government outflows were an essential component supponing an aggressive,
expmsionist Jilase of U.S. capital. The dollar was the top currency, and U.S. capital was rapidly penetrating the
closed martt:ts of the decimated European colonial empires. The logic of communist containment justified
vinually any act of imperial intervermon to protect the interests of u.s. capital and the swe.
But by the mid-1970s the foundations of U.S. global economic and political hegemony were eroding.
Gradually the long-established paradigm that fused the interests of transnational capital and the state into a
unified vision of global dominance was transfonned. Policy makers realized that the accumulation goals and
sttategies of transnational capital did oot necessarily redound to expansion of imperial state power.
These considerations underlie the periodic but relatively persistent efforts by the Treasury Department to
chip away at Section 936, the linchpin of the modem Pueno Rican colony. The federal governmenl is acutely
aware ofhow imponanl the Section 936 tax credit is to employment and investment in the Island, and knows that
"a pw;e out of Section 936 would cause ecooomic dislocation in Pueno Rico." (Hearings, V 3, p. 205)
Nonetheless, in its annual reports on the "possessions corporation system of taxation," the Treasury Depanment
argues that Section 936 is a giveaway for the multinational corporations that results in billions of dollars in lost
revenue for the federal government Since 1976, Treasury has periodically tried to persuade Congress to rescind
the credit as a way of reducing the federal deficit Only because of a monumental lobbying effort by the PPD, its
Congressional allies and the Puerto Rico, U.S.A. Foundation was the Treasury's 1985 campaign to abolish the
credit defeared. But Treasury has, with its revenue enhancing allieS in Congress, enacted measures that have
of&et the tax benefits of Section 936.

The implications of this squabbling are theoretically significant It suggests that the federal government and
capital are divided as to the benefits ai¥1 costs of sustaining Puerto Rico as a colony.

It is anyone's guess whether the referendum will be held next year and according to the terms of Senate Bill
712. Numerous and elaborate scenarios as to the likely outcome of the legislative process proliferate in the media
ai¥1 the halls of power. The preceding pages identify the domestic political and international ecooomic factors
that may have mocivared the U.S. to by ai¥1 rework the oolonial formula
So far, the referendum process has made it clear that the U.S. government is searching for an efficacious and
eammica1 arrmganed that will guarantee it unrestricted military access to Puerto Rico and preserve the vital
eamomic interests ofU. S. films. In the process, the competing interests of different sectors of capital, the federal
bureaucracy, the Congress and Puerto Rico's political party leadership (wrose participation, after an is required
to lend a semtulce oflegitimacy to the process), have all surfaced. This has hindered the legislative process and
coofoundcd negotiations.
The putmc hearings have revealed that. while the prevailing colonial fonnula is Wtworkable, the U.S.
government has oo intention of revising the existing legislation to enhance the autonomous powers of the
Canmonwealth. The smart money bets that the referendum will oot be held in 1991 as spelled out in Senale Bill
712 umi oow, the U.S. government has not been able to <Jevise a fonnula that is satisfactory to all those who
have a stake in Puerto Rico's political future. Unless the conflicting array of demands is resolved, the U. S. would
apparendy rather keep its tx>bbled colony for oow. But if we see the referendum as an initial response to economic
ml political transfonnations that are eroding the viability of the Commonwealth, it is reasonable to expect that
Pueno Rim's swus will be redefined sometime in this cauury.

-
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